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Although these are interesting questions, I
am not here to argue for a particular scenario that
entails specific paths for interest rates and
exchange rates. What I will focus upon instead is
a dimension of the adjustment process that I think
has been neglected in public discussions. My
topic is the potential effect of demographic
changes on the current account. The developed
world has begun a major demographic transition.
Over the next 30 years the number of elderly in
the United States, the European Union and Japan
will increase substantially, likely by more than
100 percent, while the number of workers will
increase very little, likely by less than 10 percent.2
Such a large change in the number of elderly citi-
zens relative to the number of workers has numer-
ous implications for all of the economic decisions
that determine economic growth. In a world in
which financial capital flows relatively freely, it
is likely that large demographic changes will be
felt in current account balances throughout the
world.
Demographic changes have been discussed
extensively in the context of the challenges facing
governmental programs providing funds for pen-
sions and health care. In a recent speech I stressed
that the combination of increased life expectancy
and a reduced birth rate has created problems
for Social Security and Medicare that must be
S
ince early 1998 the U.S. current account
balance has trended downward, a fact
that has attracted much attention in the
United States and elsewhere around
the world. As a share of total output, the U.S.
current account deficit has increased from
roughly 2 percent to levels exceeding 5.5 percent
during 2004. As you can see in Figure 1, prior to
recent developments, in the post World War II
period the largest U.S. current account deficit
was nearly 3.5 percent during the mid 1980s.
Thus, it is clear that today’s current account
deficit substantially exceeds those of recent his-
tory. Even if one examines a much longer time
period, the size of the U.S. current account deficit
is large. One must go back to the 1800s to find
a period of large deficits and, even then, the
deficits in the 1870s did not exceed 3 percent.
It is accurate to say that the size of the U.S. cur-
rent account deficit is at a historic level.1
Based on economic theory, it is also clear
that such a deficit cannot continue to expand
indefinitely. As a result, the issue of sustainability
has received much attention. Many have won-
dered how much larger this deficit will become
before it is reversed. The nature of the reversal is
also of utmost interest. Will the reversal be orderly
or disruptive?
1 Not only is the U.S. current account deficit at a historic level, but in a recent speech Alan Greenspan (2005) argued that the current interna-
tional economic environment is one with “little relevant historical precedent” because of advances in technology, improvements in trans-
portation networks, and changes in financial markets.
2 The figures cited are from an article by Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003).
3 The speech, “World Population Trends and Challenges,” was presented on October 4, 2004, at Lincoln University, Jefferson City, Missouri.addressed.3 Virtually all developed countries are
facing fiscal problems associated with the aging
of their populations. I will argue that these demo-
graphic changes, which are without historical
precedent, have important implications for the
course of current account balances throughout
the world. Despite the fact that the connections
between population aging, pensions and health-
care, and international capital flows have received
increased academic attention in recent years, I
think the connection between demographic
changes and international capital flows deserves
even more attention from academics and policy-
makers.4
To illustrate the potential importance of demo-
graphic changes for a country’s current account,
I will highlight the possible developments in
Japan, a country that is an excellent example of a
developed country in the midst of major demo-
graphic changes. A complete analysis would
require similar work on other countries and explo-
ration of the significance for world current account
balances and capital flows of demographic differ-
ences across countries. My purpose today is to
create interest in this subject, by showing how
large the effects could be for a single country,
Japan.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
























U.S. Current Account as a Percent of GNP, 1870-2003 (Annual Data)
NOTE: Historical series is from International Historical Statistics, The Americas 1750-1993, 4th Edition by B.R. Mitchell.
4 Recent research by Brooks (2003), Fehr et al. (2003), Börsch-Supan et al. (2004), and Mc Morrow and Roeger (2004) provide general equilib-
rium analyses that show the connection between aging and international capital flows.president and director of research, and Cletus C.
Coughlin, vice president in the Research Division,
who provided special assistance. However, I
retain full responsibility for errors.
SOME BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
ACCOUNTING
To set the stage for my subsequent discussion,
I will spend a few minutes discussing some con-
cepts from balance of payments accounting. A
country’s balance of payments is a systematic
account of all the exchanges of value between
residents of that country and the rest of the world
during a given period of time. Thus, the U.S.
current account summarizes all transactions
involving flows of goods, services, income, and
unilateral transfers that take place between U.S.
and foreign entities, which include private indi-
viduals, businesses, and governments. The cur-
rent account balance is simply the difference
between U.S. receipts from the rest of the world
and U.S. payments to the rest of the world as a
result of these transactions.
U.S. receipts arise from exports of goods and
services, capital income received by U.S. owners
of assets abroad, the reinvested earnings of the
foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations, and gifts
to the United States from foreign residents and
governments. Conversely, U.S. payments result
from imports of goods and services, capital income
paid to foreign owners of U.S. assets, the rein-
vested earnings of U.S. affiliates of foreign cor-
porations, and gifts from the United States to
foreign residents and governments.
Enumerating the components of the current
account highlights a number of important facts.
First, the receipts and payments encompass much
more than the movement of merchandise across
national borders. Second, the current account
reflects the interaction of numerous decisions by
individuals, firms, and governments both in the
United States and abroad.
Dollars are also received and paid on capital
account. Dollars are received when foreign indi-
viduals, firms and governments buy U.S. assets,
and dollars are paid when U.S. individuals, firms
and governments buy foreign assets. As is true of
current account transactions, capital account
transactions have many different motivations.
As in any market, equilibrium in the foreign
exchange market requires that the number of
dollars sold equals the number of dollars bought.
Dollars are bought for both current and capital
account, and sold for both current and capital
account. Consequently, a current account surplus,
when receipts exceed payments, necessarily
means that the United States, on net, is acquiring
assets abroad. That is, equilibrium in the foreign
exchange market requires that a current account
surplus be matched by a capital account deficit.
Similarly, when U.S. payments exceed receipts,
as has been the case in recent years, foreigners,
on net, are acquiring assets in the United States.
The current account deficit is then matched by a
capital account surplus. It is also important to
note that U.S. capital inflows, which reflect for-
eign saving, are equal to the difference between
investment in physical capital and domestic
saving in the United States.
Finally, although a current account deficit
necessarily involves a capital account surplus,
and vice versa, it is not correct to view the capital
account as financing the current account other
than in an accounting sense. We could equally
well say that the current account deficit finances
the capital account surplus. The current and
capital accounts are simultaneously determined;
causation does not flow in any simple way from
one account to the other.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
Because the perspective on the current
account balance that I want to encourage differs
somewhat from common perspectives, I will
spend a few minutes summarizing these more
common perspectives. Catherine Mann (2002)
has identified three different perspectives for
analyzing the U.S. current account balance. Using
her terminology, the three perspectives are as
follows: 1. a domestic perspective based on the
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international perspective based on trade flows in
goods and services, and 3. an international per-
spective based on flows and holdings of financial
assets.5 I will discuss these perspectives in order.
The domestic perspective of a country’s cur-
rent account balance based on national income
and product accounts focuses on how patterns of
domestic saving and investment are connected
to the trade and current account balances. The
connection follows from the accounting identity
that a country’s domestic production must equal
its spending plus its trade balance. This identity is
one that I will use later when I examine potential
current account changes in Japan. A frequently
highlighted identity is that the sum of the two
main sources of saving—private domestic saving
and the foreign capital inflow—must equal the
sum of the two main sources of demand for finan-
cial capital—private sector investment and the
government budget deficit.
If we make the assumption—which I do not
necessarily want to make—that domestic private
saving and investment are roughly equal or tend
to change by similar amounts, the government
budget deficit then mirrors the current account
deficit. In the 1980s the similar movement of
these two variables was characterized as the twin
deficits and the argument was that the govern-
ment budget deficit caused the current account
deficit. Not only did these variables move in a
similar manner, but it was argued that they were
driven by the same policy fundamentals. Expan-
sionary fiscal policy, reflected in large government
budget deficits, stimulated domestic spending
on goods produced both in the United States and
abroad. Such spending propelled U.S. growth
and U.S. imports. At the same time, the fiscal
deficit in conjunction with tight monetary policy
kept interest rates high and attracted foreign capi-
tal, which resulted in dollar appreciation.
The argument is plausible, at least under
some circumstances. There is, however, no empiri-
cal regularity that a country’s government budget
deficit moves similarly to its current account
deficit. A recent demonstration of this fact is that
in the late 1990s the U.S. federal budget moved
from deficit to surplus while the current account
deficit widened. It would take me too far afield
to explore this issue further, but the main point
is that the budget deficit is a grossly inadequate
summary measure of fiscal policy, which has
important and complex effects on relative prices,
incentives and rates of return on investment
which in turn affect both current and capital
transactions in the international accounts.
A second current account perspective is based
on international trade in goods and services.
Here the focus is on economic growth and changes
in relative prices. An increase in foreign growth
increases a country’s exports, while an increase
in domestic growth increases a country’s imports.
Meanwhile, exports grow faster when the price
of exports falls relative to competing goods and
services in the foreign market and imports grow
faster when the price of imports falls relative to
domestic goods and services.
This perspective suggests that both faster
growth in the United States relative to other coun-
tries and a real appreciation of the dollar should
tend to increase the U.S. current account deficit.
On the other hand, faster growth of foreign trad-
ing partners relative to the United States and a
real depreciation of the dollar should tend to
decrease the U.S. current account deficit. This
perspective suggests a relative slowing of U.S.
growth as well as a depreciation of the foreign
exchange value of the dollar is required for a
shrinking of the U.S. current account deficit.
A third current account perspective focuses
on international flows of financial assets. Differ-
ential rates of return, adjusted for risk, in conjunc-
tion with investors’ desired portfolio allocations
of wealth are the driving forces for international
capital flows. The very large size of international
financial flows relative to goods and services flows
raises the possibility that the current account is
driven primarily by international capital flows
rather than the goods and services flow. Clearly,
financial markets in the United States provide
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5 See Poole (2004) for another summary of these three perspectives.numerous financial instruments of varying risk
and time horizons. Moreover, the U.S. market for
most financial instruments is highly liquid. In
the current context, an important issue is what
happens if investors decide to reduce their over-
all exposure to U.S. credit and currency risk. In
other words, how will the adjustment process
proceed?
All the preceding perspectives are potentially
useful in examining the changes in the U.S. cur-
rent account. However, they are missing an
important dimension of how rational economic
decisionmakers think because the standard per-
spectives miss the intertemporal consequences
of the different demographic circumstances across





The connection between demographic
changes and international capital flows follows
directly from the life-cycle theory of consumption
and saving developed by Franco Modigliani and
Richard Brumberg in their 1954 paper (1980).
The argument is straightforward. Based on the
general pattern of lifetime earnings, a random
sample of households ranked according to income
level would show a disproportionately large num-
ber of middle-aged people at the upper end of
the income distribution and a disproportionately
large number of young and elderly people at the
lower end. Both the young and the old households
have a high average propensity to consume. In
fact, many consume more than their incomes
and, as a result, dissave rather than save. The
young borrow against their future income, while
the elderly reduce their previously accumulated
wealth to consume beyond their current incomes.
In contrast, middle-aged households exhibit a
relatively lower average propensity to consume.
During middle age these households are paying
back earlier debts or saving for old age. These
ideas are easily extended to the entire economy.
When, overall, a population can be character-
ized as middle aged, then the economy should
tend to have a higher saving rate than when it
can be characterized as old. Thus, as the popula-
tion of a country moves from being characterized
as middle aged to old, it is reasonable to expect a
country’s saving rate to decrease. Unless the
country’s investment rate moves identically,
then foreign capital flows and current account
balances will be affected. Exactly how depends
on the change in investment.
The decline in the number of workers associ-
ated with an aging population tends to depress
investment demand relative to a case of no
decline in workers. Eventually, the decline in
saving will exceed the decline in investment,
which will cause a country’s current account to
decrease. However, it is not obvious whether
aging would immediately cause investment to
fall more or less than saving. It is possible that
domestic investment falls more than saving ini-
tially because of persistence in saving habits.
The key point is that the saving-investment bal-
ances of individual countries can evolve in com-
plex ways.
This complexity is compounded by the inter-
national dimensions of this issue. The impact of
aging on national saving relative to investment
will not necessarily be the same for every country.
At the global level, the sum of current account
balances must be zero. Thus, what matters is not
the fact of aging for a specific country, but rather
how it is aging relative to other countries.
A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE
ON THE JAPANESE CURRENT
ACCOUNT BALANCE
To illustrate more vividly the demographic
perspective for analyzing a country’s current
account balance, I have done some relatively
straightforward calculations for Japan. The pro-
jections I generate should not be viewed as fore-
casts, but rather as suggestive of how demographic
changes can affect a country’s current account.
Admittedly, my calculations do not rely on a
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however, my example does provide strong reasons
that support my argument advocating increased
use of the demographic perspective.
To set the stage for my calculations, I will
spend a few moments providing the underlying
foundation. There are three forces driving the
current account of a particular country in the
long run: 1. demographics; 2. the growth of labor
productivity; and 3. the growth in per capita
domestic demand for goods and services. The
important aspects of demographics are the size
of the total population, the size of the working
age population and the fraction of the working
age population that is employed. These three
elements determine the size of the labor force that
is available to produce output in the economy.
The amount of labor available multiplied by out-
put per worker determines the amount of goods
and services that can be supplied from domestic
production.
Total domestic demand for goods and serv-
ices, includes household consumption, private
investment in new capital goods and government
purchases for either consumption or public invest-
ment. The total of these demands is sometimes
referred to as absorption. The growth in per capita
absorption is one measure of the rate of increase
in the standard of living in an economy.
Per capita absorption multiplied by the size
of the total population determines the total domes-
tic demand for goods and services. Any difference
between domestic demand and the amount of
output that can be produced within the economy
will generate a current account balance. If domes-
tic demand is less than the goods and services
produced in the economy, then the excess can be
sold abroad. In this case exports will exceed
imports and the current account balance will
show a surplus. On the other hand, if domestic
demand exceeds the productive capacity of the
domestic economy, then the only way that the
excess demand can be satisfied is through pur-
chases of goods and services produced abroad.
In this case imports will exceed exports and the
current account balance will tend to show a
deficit. Of course, the deficit can only arise if the
country can borrow abroad or run down assets
abroad accumulated at an earlier date.
Panel 1 of Figure 2 illustrates the demographic
transition in Japan. Total population growth has
slowed over the past 25 years and as of 2002 was
barely positive. The Japanese population is pro-
jected to start shrinking before the end of the
current decade. The rate of contraction is believed
to grow steadily through the middle of the cen-
tury, approaching one percent per year.6 In
addition to the shrinkage of the total Japanese
population, the population is aging. As a result
the growth rate of the working age population,
defined here as persons ages 15 to 64, turned
negative almost a decade ago and is projected to
shrink at a faster rate than the total population
through the middle of the century. Hence, as
seen in Panel 2 of Figure 2, the fraction of the
population of working age declines steadily over
the projection period.
The final piece of the demographic picture is
the fraction of the working age population that is
employed. Panel 2 of Figure 2 shows that this
fraction was quite steady in the 1970-80s at about
70 percent. In the early 1990s the fraction rose to
around 74 percent, where is has remained. There
are no official projections of the ratio of employed
to working age persons, so for this illustration I
have kept the fraction constant at 74 percent.
The second element, labor productivity
growth, is shown in Panel 3 of Figure 2. The
annual growth of output per worker in Japan has
been quite volatile since 1980. From 1990 through
2002, a period of slow growth in the Japanese
economy, the average annual rate of labor pro-
ductivity growth was 1.26 percent. For purposes
of this illustration I have projected a constant
annual growth of output per worker at the aver-
age rate of the recent period.
Panel 3 also shows that output per capita
will grow more slowly than output-per-worker.
ECONOMIC GROWTH
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6 These data are the medium variant population projections prepared by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
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Our Projections Historical Data
Employment ratio = .74 (2002 value)
Assumed Growth of Absorption per capita = 1.26 percent per
year.
Assumed Growth of Productivity per worker = 1.26 percent
per year (average rate for 1990-2002)



















Our Projections Dekle Table 3 Historical Data
Employment ratio = .74 (2002 value)
Assumed Growth of Absorption per capita = 1.05 percent per
year.
Assumed Growth of Productivity per worker = 1.26 percent per
year (average rate for 1990-2002)
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Figure 2This follows directly from the aging of the popu-
lation and a potential labor force that is shrinking
relative to the total population. The average
growth rate of output per capita over the projec-
tion period (2003 to 2050) is only 0.84 percent
per year. If the Japanese current account were to
remain balanced over the projection period, this
would be the limit to average growth of absorp-
tion per capita.
Growth of per capita absorption can be
increased above that of domestic production by
using the past accumulation of claims on the rest
of the world to purchase foreign output. As an
example, assume that Japan were to import a
sufficient amount of goods and services such
that the average growth of absorption per capita
equaled the growth rate of domestic labor produc-
tivity. Under these assumptions, the Japanese
current account would turn negative before the
end of this decade, fall to about –10 percent of
GDP around 2025 and then decline sharply fur-
ther after 2035, as shown in Panel 4 of Figure 2.
As yet another alternative, consider the impli-
cation of sustaining the growth rate of absorption
per capita midway between the growth that can
be supported by domestic production and the
growth rate of labor productivity, 1.05 percent
per year. The projection of the current account
for this scenario is shown in Panel 5 of Figure 2.
The current account deficit as a share of gross
domestic product falls to roughly 5 percent
around 2015, recovers a bit relative to gross domes-
tic product through the early 2030s, and then
declines sharply to more than 10 percent of gross
domestic product by the middle of the century.
A few years ago, Robert Dekle (2000)
addressed the question of the long-term impact
of demographics on the Japanese current account
using a model with explicit microeconomic foun-
dations. His projections of the current account
deficit are indicated by the diamond shaped
points in Panel 5 of Figure 2. It is clear that the
projections from Dekle’s alternative model are well
approximated by the simple model I have used.
Obviously the scenarios I have chosen to
highlight are only some of many possible scenar-
ios, and there is a substantial uncertainty about
the size of the long-term projected deficit in the
Japanese current account. Nevertheless the con-
clusion that the Japanese current account will be
driven into a deficit in the relatively near future,
and that this deficit will be chronic and increas-
ing is difficult to dismiss. The logic of the argu-
ment is pretty simple. Japan has an aging
population and has accumulated substantial
assets abroad. Why shouldn’t we expect the eld-
erly Japanese to use some of those assets to sup-
port consumption in excess of the goods and
services that can be produced by the shrinking
Japanese labor force?
CONCLUSION
My modest goal today was to convince you
that examining current account balances from a
demographic perspective is potentially very use-
ful. The intertemporal approach to current account
balances is well-grounded in economic theory.
Saving and investment behavior are the keys to
the evolution of a country’s current account. It is
exactly these behaviors that the demographic
perspective highlights. Moreover, the fact that
many countries, especially those in the developed
world, are experiencing major demographic
changes suggests that additional focus from the
demographic perspective is warranted.
The demographic perspective that I have dis-
cussed can be used to calm some of the anxiety
about the historically large U.S. current account
deficit. As I emphasized previously, my calcula-
tions for Japan should be viewed as illustrative
rather than predictive. It is clear that Japan and
Europe face imminent demographic challenges.
Thus, it is natural that they accumulate claims
against a country that has financial markets and
economic growth prospects of sufficient magni-
tude to facilitate the required adjustment process.
A case can be made that the current account sur-
pluses of these countries as well as the current
account deficits of the United States will be
reversed in the future as these aging economies
draw on their claims against the United States. I
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played out; however, I do know that I look for-
ward to additional research and discussion on
this topic from a demographic perspective.
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